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WHISTLEBLOWERS CASH IN,
UNWARY CORPORATIONS PAY
John Ashcroft*
CatherineHanaway**
ClaudiaL. Oihate Greim***

I.

INTRODUCTION

notwithstanding,
times
of recession
Tough
economic
whistleblowers can be paid handsomely for exposing the misdeeds of
corporate America. Depending upon the statute under which they
disclose, whistleblowers can be paid a windfall1 of as much as thirty
percent of the total recovery.

2

With corporate malfeasance cases

regularly settling for hundreds of millions-sometimes billions-of
dollars,3 trial lawyers and whistleblowers are highly motivated to make

cases for the government.
Until recently, whistleblowers only reaped these rewards when
Uncle Sam's purse was involved.4 But in the wake of corporate
* Attorney General of the United States from 2001-2005. Previously, Mr. Ashcroft
represented the people of Missouri as Governor from 1985-1993 and as U.S. Senator from 19942001.
** U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri from 2005-2009, and prior to that
service, Ms. Hanaway served as the Speaker of the Missouri House of Representatives.
*** Partner at The Ashcroft Law Firm, LLC.
1. This term, or words of like connotation, are used in this Article not in the pejorative sense
but, rather, to underscore the large sums whistleblowers stand to be paid for their informationsums that might eclipse what any individual might earn in a lifetime. These often substantial
rewards raise an important public policy question, namely, whether they provide a basis for perverse
incentives on the part of whistleblowers to provide improperly obtained or even manufactured
and/or inaccurate information. An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
2. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (Supp. TV 2011);
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed.
Reg. 34,300, 34,366 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay
$1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html [hereinafter Eli Lilly to Pay $1.415
Billion].
4. See William Gleeson, What Corporate Managers Should Know About the SEC
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malfeasance, fraudulent accounting, and Ponzi schemes which defrauded
investors to the tune of billions of dollars, many argued that it was time
to loosen the whistleblower's terrible swift sword on corporate America
at large.5 In July 2010, Congress passed, and President Barack Obama
signed, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act"). 6 Among Congress's goals in passing this
sweeping overhaul of U.S. financial regulation was to incentivize
individuals with knowledge of possible misconduct to share their
information with the government.7 Ten months later, on May 25, 2011,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") adopted
regulations to implement Congress's mandate.8 In the words of SEC
Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, the SEC's newly-created Office of the
Whistleblower will serve to strengthen the agency's efforts in detecting
and preventing fraud:
Today's proposed final rules build upon our efforts ... and our
experience with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act .... From that experience, we
learned that despite Sarbanes-Oxley, too many people remain silent in
the face of fraud. Today's rules are intended to break the silence of
those who see a wrong.9

Part II of this Article places the Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower
provisions in context with existing whistleblower provisions. Part III
examines the particulars of the SEC's new whistleblower program,
noting other federal whistleblower laws currently affecting American
enterprises and assisting fraud enforcement. Finally, Part IV provides
practical advice to the corporation on steps that can be taken now to

Whistleblower Rules, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CoRP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 10,
2011, 9:47 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/07/10/what-corporate-managersshould-know-about-the-sec-whistleblower-rules.
5. See, e.g., Angela Canterbury, ProtectingWhistleblowers, AMS. FOR FIN. REFORM (Aug. 6,
2009, 6:40 AM), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2009/08/protecting-whistleblowers/.
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
7. See Recent Legislation, Corporate Law-Securities Regulation-Congress Expands
Incentivesfor Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC-Dodd-FrankAct, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-49 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6), 124
HARv. L. REv. 1829, 1829-30 (2011) [hereinafter CorporateLaw].
8. See Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 3464545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249); Final
Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/finalarchivelfinalarchive
201 .shtml (last updated Feb. 27, 2012) (reflecting that the whistleblower provisions of Section 21F
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were implemented on May 25, 2011).
9. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening Statement at SEC
Open Meeting: Item 2-Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
201 1/spchO5251 Imls-item2.htm.
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strengthen internal compliance regimes so as to encourage early internal
reporting of suspected corporate wrongdoing.
1I. THE DODD-FRANK ACT TAKES ITS PLACE AMONG EXISTING
WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS

As SEC Chairman Schapiro referenced, and as qui tam cases
mentioned in this Article attest,' ° whistleblowers already played an
integral role in exposing corporate criminality prior to the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "SarbanesOxley Act")." Indeed, the federal whistleblowing incentive policy has
an ancient lineage-at least in the world of federal statutory regulation
of trade and commerce. Fraudulent procurement activity affecting the
Union Army during the Civil War gave rise to the False Claims Act (the
"FCA"),12a mechanism federal and state enforcement officials utilize to
this day to combat fraud involving government programs. 3 The FCA's
qui tam' 4 provisions allow a private individual-known as a "relator"to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the United States.' 5 The relator must have
actual knowledge that a named defendant knowingly submitted or
caused the submission of false or fraudulent claims to the United
States.16

How important is the FCA in practice? Private-party
whistleblowers-whether part of a qui tam action or otherwise-have
played pivotal roles in unmasking corporate fraud at Fortune 500 giants
such as Enron Corporation, Tyco International, MCI WorldCom, and
Adelphia Communications Corporation."' But perhaps statistics tell the
10. See infra text accompanying notes 17-23.
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
12. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). The FCA provides for liability for triple damages and a penalty from
$5000 to $10,000 per claim for anyone who knowingly submits or causes the submission of a false
or fraudulent claim to the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
13. James F. Barger, Jr. et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud:An Empirical Study of Emerging
State False Claims Acts, 80 TuL. L. REv. 465, 470 (2005).
14. "Qui tam" is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur," meaning "he who brings a case on behalf of our lord the King, as well as
for himself." Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 470-71.
16. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). While a relator need not have been
personally harmed by the defendant's conduct, he or she stands to gain a percentage of the
recovered funds flowing from a successful suit. Id.§ 3730(d); Barger et al., supra note 13, at 471,
474.
17. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 357, 360-64, 369-73 (2003) (discussing whistleblower
involvement in unmasking fraud at various major corporations).
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story best: The U.S. Department of Justice (the "DOJ") announced late8
last year that FCA recoveries following the 1986 FCA amendments
through 2010 exceeded $27 billion, with qui tam cases accounting for
more than $18 billion of this amount. 19 During that same period, qui tam
whistleblowers received over $2.8 billion from the government for their
information.2 °
Whistleblowers are valuable precisely because they have first-hand
knowledge of illegal corporate activity, and therein lies the success of
FCA qui tam suits: The federal government has been able to harness
internal information collected by private individuals with greater
awareness of corporate activity than could ever be detected, at least
initially, from the outside. 1 In addition, a whistleblower brings to a case
a speaking witness who can identify responsible executives and key
documents, and lay out the critical facts-essentially giving
regulators, and assistant U.S. attorneys a roadmap to make
investigators,
22
a case.
It would not be an exaggeration to state that qui tam lawsuits
represent a unique cottage industry within the legal sector-and, in these
lean economic times, a growing industry at that.23 Some have argued that
whistleblowers, and qui tam relators in particular, are a necessary
resource of an increasingly cash-strapped government, as it relates to
FCA cases, to stop fraud against the government and, as a rationale for
24
the new SEC whistleblower program, to enforce federal securities laws.
18. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (current
version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). Among other things, the False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986 entitles qui tam relators to bounties of between fifteen to thirty percent of
recovered funds received from defendants and to recover attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses upon a
successful prosecution. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2) (2006). In addition, the 1986
revisions contain explicit whistleblower protections for employees involved in actions against their
employers. Id. § 3730(h). See United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 964-69 (9th Cir. 1995)
(describing congressional imperatives related to the 1986 FCA amendments). See also Robert
Salcido, Screening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the
JurisdictionalBar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 237 (1995)
(discussing the "public disclosure bar" in relation to the 1986 FCA amendments).
19. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion in False
Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2010 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/
10-civ-1335.html [hereinafter Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion].
20. Id.
21. See Barger et al., supra note 13, at 475.
22. See id.
23. Douglas W. Baruch & Nancy N. Barr, The SEC's Whistleblower Program: What the SEC
Has Learnedfrom the False Claims Act About Avoiding Whistleblower Abuses, 2 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. ONLINE 28, 29 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/201l/O7/Baruch-BarrWhistleblower.pdf See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
24. See United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 1995); Baruch & Barr,
supra note 23, at 28-29.
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An inherent conflict of interest in this activity, aggravated by the huge
sums at stake, needs to be acknowledged: By design, the percentage-ofreward structure payable to these whistleblowers means that higher
recoveries, fines, and monetary sanctions translate to higher
whistleblower rewards.
In this respect, whistleblowers have a perverse incentive to sit on
knowledge of suspected wrongdoing instead of reporting at the first
opportunity-after all, whistleblower information related to malfeasance
that is allowed to fester and grow means a potentially higher bounty.26
Moreover, just as delayed reporting benefits a whistleblower,
enforcement authorities also stand to gain the greater the recovery or the
fine.27 While individuals who work for enforcement authorities do not
stand to personally financially gain from large awards, they do gain
professionally and reputationally from the publicity and notoriety
associated with large awards.28
Whether the disincentives to report on time cause actual delay, the
fact remains that the government receives valuable tips from
whistleblowers leading to successful civil and criminal actions. As much
value as whistleblowers provide to U.S. taxpayers, shareholders, and
corporate executives alike, disclosing corporate criminality could come
at a price--employer retaliation, harassment, discrimination-that might
deter individuals in a position to minimize the potential scope of the

25. See Section 2 IF of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 3464545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,350 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
26. Id.
27. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") established a
national Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program ("HCFAC"), under the joint direction of the
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), to
coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement activities with respect to health care fraud and
abuse. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, sec.
201(a), § 1128C, 110 Stat. 1936, 1992-93 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2006 & Supp. IV
2011)). Under HIPAA, an amount equaling recoveries from health care investigations-including
criminal fines, forfeitures, civil settlements and judgments, and administrative penalties-is
deposited into a trust fund, which is then appropriated to an expenditure account, called the Health
Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account, in amounts that the Secretary of the DHHS and Attorney
General jointly certify as necessary to finance anti-fraud activities. Id. sec. 201(b), § 1817(k), 110
Stat. at 1993-95 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k) (2006)). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM

ANN. REP. FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 5, 7 (2011) [hereinafter HCFAC FY 2010 REPORT], available
at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2OlO.pdf (noting that in fiscal year 2010,
the HCFAC program deposited approximately $4 billion into the trust fund, and appropriated $85
million and $492 million to the DOJ and DHHS, respectively).
28. See Gleeson, supra note 4 (explaining that if the SEC does not receive the appropriate
resources for its new enforcement responsibilities, it is likely that the SEC will pursue only the most
serious violations with higher monetary sanctions, making "whistleblowing more attractive").
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wrongdoing from sharing what they know. 29 Notably, the SEC has had a
whistleblower bounty program for reports of insider trading violations
since 1989. 30 As of the date the Dodd-Frank Act was passed, the
program resulted in an aggregate of $159,537 paid to a mere five
claimants. 3 1 The Dodd-Frank Act, layering percentage-of-recovery
bounties and erecting new anti-retaliatory measures similar to those
already available to relators under the33 FCA,32 was intended to
counterbalance the potential chilling effect.
Why, then, has the SEC's adoption of final whistleblower rules
sparked such heated debate, both within the legal and business
communities and, perhaps more surprisingly, among the SEC
commissioners themselves? 3 4 Commentators like the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce bluntly warned that the SEC's new whistleblower regime
makes it "harder and slower to detect and stop corporate fraud-by
undermining the strong compliance systems set up under Sarbanes Oxley
to ensure companies take whistleblowers seriously. ' 35 Private enterprise

29. See Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,355 n.433.
30. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS, REP. No.
474, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC's BOUNTY PROGRAM 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2010/474.pdf.
31. Id.at 5. Perhaps in a nod to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, on July 23, 2010, the SEC
announced its largest payoff-$1 million-to two individuals who furnished information related to
insider trading in Microsoft Corporation securities by Pequot Capital Management, Inc., the hedge
fund's chief executive, and a Microsoft employee. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Pequot Capital Mgmt.,
Inc., Litigation Release No. 21,601, 98 SEC Docket 3586 (July 23, 2010).
32. Section 1079A(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act strengthens the anti-retaliation provision of the
FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), by providing a three-year statute of limitations on civil claims against
retaliatory employers and revising the definition of protected conduct, thereby expanding the class
of protected persons and activities that could inform a qui tam action or otherwise report an FCA
violation. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
1079A(c), § 3301(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2079 (2010) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (Supp. IV
2011)).
33. CorporateLaw, supra note 7, at 1831.
34. The SEC voted three to two to adopt final rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act
whistleblower provisions. Edward Wyatt, Overcoming Dissenters, S.E.C. Adopts Revised WhistleBlower Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, at B3. Dissenting SEC Commissioners Kathleen L. Casey
and Troy A. Paredes both issued statements concerning their respective reservations with the final
rules as adopted. See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement by SEC
Commissioner: Adoption of Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch052511klc-item2.htm [hereinafter Casey Dissent] (opining that the SEC "has elected to
implement a whistleblower program that favors a pound of cure over an ounce of prevention"); Troy
A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt Final Rules
for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (May 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/201l/spch05251 tap-item2.htm [hereinafter
Paredes Dissent].
35. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Warns New SEC
Whistleblower Rule Will Undermine Corporate Compliance Programs (May 25, 2011),
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is not alone in vocalizing strong concern, if not outright opposition, to
the new measures. Shortly before the SEC's announcement of the final
rules, Representative Scott Garrett, Chairman of the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government-Sponsored
Enterprises, remarked at a congressional hearing convened to further
examine the Dodd-Frank Act.36 Representative Garrett stated:
The goal of providing an environment where whistleblowers can be
most effective in helping to right wrongs and where they have proper
safeguards is a laudable one. The details of writing into law the proper
incentives and rules to create such an environment ... are very

important,
as well. We must be careful not to do more harm than
37
good.

Without question, passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ushered in an
era of heightened awareness of the need for robust compliance programs
and governance regimes.38 From a deterrence standpoint, whistleblowers
perform a wholly different function and at an entirely distinct time:
Whereas compliance programs are designed to prevent the commission
of illegal activity in the first instance, whistleblowers instead act as a
backstop to minimize the damage already done by the uncovered
misconduct.39
Major American corporations well understand the cost of creating
and maintaining compliance and reporting programs which meet the
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. As several studies confirm,
compliance is costly even to "compliant" organizations that operate
within the bounds of the law.40 Calculating the costs of noncompliance
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/201 1/may/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whistleblowerrule-will-undermine-corporate-complia. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce went on to state that
"whistleblowers will go straight to the SEC with allegations of wrongdoing and keep companies in
the dark. This leaves expensive, robust compliance programs collecting dust, while violations
continue to fester, eroding shareholder value." Id.
36. See Press Release, Representative Scott Garrett, Chairman, U.S. House Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts. & Gov't-Sponsored Enters., Garrett Chairs Subcommittee Hearing to Review DoddFrank Whistleblower Provisions (May 11, 2011), http://garrett.house.gov/press-release/garrettchairs-subcommittee-hearing-review-dodd-frank-whistleblower-provisions.
37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for SarbanesOxley Corporateand SecuritiesFraudWhistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91, 107-09 (2007).
39. See Casey Dissent, supra note 34.
40. See OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY OF THE SARBANESOXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS 37-55 (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-404_

study.pdf (explaining the costs of compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Anwer S. Ahmed et al.,
How Costly Is the Sarbanes Oxley Act? Evidence on the Effects of the Act on Corporate
Profitability, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 352, 353 (2010) (finding that average cash flows declined by 1.3% of
total assets after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, with annual costs ranging from $6 million for
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discovered by an internal whistleblower is an entirely different matter.
The reputational penalties attendant with public disclosure of corporate
wrongdoing could, of course, pose the harshest penalties companies
stand to bear.4' With respect to quantifiable costs, however, and from the
standpoint of the corporate defendant, whistleblower rewards and
monetary sanctions imposed in connection with civil and/or criminal
enforcement by governmental entities are two sides of the same coin:
both flow from company coffers and, in the case of public companies,
from their shareholders.4 2
The costs of noncompliance resulting in a whistleblower exposure
of malfeasance are exponentially higher for the defendant corporation.
The ultimate price to pay is the deprivation of personal liberty when an
executive goes to jail for wrongdoing that is exposed. Short of that, the
penalties are potentially devastating to corporations who save in the
short run on compliance. These penalties range from debarment in
federal programs-a corporate life-threatening event for firms with a
high percentage of government business such as defense contractors,
medical device manufacturers, and pharmaceutical companies-to
reputational damages costing the target company customers and
shareholder value.4 3 In addition, actual monetary penalties, particularly
in FCA actions, frequently range into the hundreds of millions of
dollars. 44
Prudent companies weigh the costs of a well-conceived, functional
compliance regime against the less certain but potentially devastating
costs of illegality. Faced with the Dodd-Frank Act's mandate to erect
additional whistleblower incentives, the SEC chose to allow
whistleblowers to pass go, potentially bypassing corporate compliance
programs altogether to collect their $200 (euphemistically-realistically,
effective whistleblowers stand to collect tens of millions of dollars) from
smaller firms to $39 million for larger firms); Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have
a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 252 (2009). See also Francesco Bova et al., The SarbanesOxley Act and Exit Strategies of Private Firms 9-10 (May 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1730242 (noting that compliance costs have shifted incentives
of private firms seeking to go public through merger with a public acquirer or via an initial public
offering); Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going Private Decisions 6-8 (Mar.
1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.hbs.edu/units/am/pdf/imo2005papers/
IMO2005EngelHayesWang.pdf.
41. See Rapp, supranote 38, at 119-20 (noting that public disclosure of corporate wrongdoing
might lead to a collapse in a company's stock price).
42. See Gleeson, supranote 4.
43. See Rapp, supra note 38, at 119-20; Jacqueline Wood, Government Contractor Standards
of Ethical Conduct: The Needfor a More Detailed Regulatory Scheme, 36 PuB. CONT. L.J. 437, 444
(2007).
44.

Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion, supra note 19.
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the SEC as a reward for their cooperation and information.45 As such, the
SEC prioritized its own enforcement actions ahead of encouraging
corporations to deal directly with internal compliance issues when the
issues first arise and before they become a contagion that infects the
entire corporation.4 6 To date, members of Congress have attempted to
revise the Dodd-Frank Act by drafting legislation which would, among
other things, mandate internal reporting as a prerequisite to receiving a
financial reward from the SEC.47
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS

Since 1989, pursuant to Section 21A(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),48 the SEC has exercised discretion in
granting awards to persons who provide information leading to the
imposition of insider trading penalties. 49 Expanding upon that authority,
the Dodd-Frank Act repeals Section 21 A(e) and adds new Section 21 F to
the Exchange Act, 50 empowering the SEC to award bounties to parties

45. See, e.g., Casey Dissent, supra note 34 (noting the "fundamental failure" of the final rules
is underestimating the "inherent risk... that the monetary sums at stake will provide a significant
enough incentive for whistleblowers to completely bypass internal reporting in favor of coming
straight to the [SEC]"); Paredes Dissent, supra note 34 (remarking on the importance of "[e]nsuring
the integrity of corporate compliance programs ... because companies with well-functioning
compliance programs may be able to detect and remedy misconduct more swiftly than the SEC
can").
46. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 35. Robert Khuzami, Director of
the SEC's Division of Enforcement, stated that "[e]arly and quick law enforcement action is the key
to preventing securities fraud and avoiding investor losses, and the whistleblower program gives us
the tools to help achieve that goal." Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC's New
Whistleblower Program Takes Effect Today (Aug. 12, 2011), http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011167.htm (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. See Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(A)
(2011). See also Press Release, Representative Michael Grimm, Reps. Grimm, Garrett, Campbell,
and Stivers Introduce Whistleblower Improvement Act (July 12, 2011), http://grimm.house.gov/
press-release/reps-grimm-garrett-campbell-and-stivers-introducewhisteblower-imprvement-act
("Dodd-Frank undermines these internal programs by incentivizing whistleblowers to go directly to
the SEC, so H.R. 2483 makes internal reporting a prerequisite for such a reward.").
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
49. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (2006); U.S. SEC. & EXClt.
COMM'N, supra note 30, at 1.
50. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-49 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (Supp. WV2011)).
Section 21F, titled "Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection," generally directs the SEC
to pay awards to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the SEC with "original information"
leading to a successful SEC enforcement action resulting in monetary sanctions totaling more than
$1 million. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)-(b). See also Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300,
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who provide information leading to the recovery of monetary sanctions
across a broader range of cases than those of civil penalties for insider
trading cases. 51 Modeled after an arguably successful Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") whistleblower program established in 2007,52 the newlycreated Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower rewards are designed to facilitate
the flow of information to federal enforcement authorities, including the
SEC, in connection with violations of the federal securities laws.53
Observers studying the impact of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act
note that it is already affecting both the flow and quantity of information
reaching enforcement authorities. 4
A.

Paying Uncle Sam: The IRS Whistleblower/Informant Program

The Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower rewards borrow from the IRS
Whistleblower/Informant Program created by the Tax Relief and Health
Care Act of 200655 and launched by the IRS in 2007.56 New Section
34,304-05 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (setting forth the final rules
for Section 2 IF).
51. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).
52. See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-201 (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=1 76632,00.html. According to a recent U.S. Government
Accountability Office report, since its inception, the IRS Whistleblower Office received over 1300
whistleblower submissions alleging tax fraud in excess of $2 million involving more than 9500
taxpayers. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-683, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS:
INCOMPLETE DATA HINDERS IRS's ABILITY TO MANAGE CLAIM PROCESSING TIME AND ENHANCE

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION 1 (2011) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.
gov/assets/330/322595.pdf. But see Letter from Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator, to Douglas L.
Shulman, I.R.S. Commissioner 1-2 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.grassley.
senate.gov/about/upload/Shulman-re-IRS-9-13-11 .pdf (urging, among other things, that the IRS
look for ways to shorten the time needed to process whistleblower claims and to improve its
communication with whistleblowers so as to encourage the "continued receipt of valuable
whistleblower claims").
53. Observing that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213,
91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff), as amended, forms part
of the Exchange Act, commentators have predicted that the enhanced whistleblower awards called
for under the Dodd-Frank Act will serve to increase FCPA investigations and enforcement activity.
See, e.g., Miller Chevalier, Whistleblower Rewards Could Drastically Change FCPA Practice,
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/
2010/whistleblower-rewards-could-drastically-change-fcpa-practice/.
54. See Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 3464545, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,354 & n.421 (estimating that the SEC "will receive approximately 30,000
tips, complaints and referrals submissions each year"). But see John F. Savarese, Hype and Reality
in the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Rules, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(July 28, 2011, 9:14 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu!corpgov/2011/07/28/hype-and-reality-in-thedodd-frank-whistleblower-rules/ (reporting that as of mid-July 2011, SEC Enforcement Director
Robert Khuzami's staff had not seen a "big spike" in whistleblower reports).
55. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The IRS Whistleblower/Informant Program created by such
legislation itself borrows from the FCA whistleblower award model, as the FCA explicitly excludes
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7623(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code") 57 establishes
a mandatory whistleblower award program concerning the submission of
information leading to the collection of tax, penalties, interest, or other
amounts from a noncompliant taxpayer. 58 Handled by a new IRS
Whistleblower Office which operates at the direction of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,59 the program represents an
enhancement of informant awards concerning internal revenue law
violations, in place since March 1867.60
The updated program has attracted a high volume of informant
information from the start: In the first twelve months after the IRS
Whistleblower Office was established, the IRS received 116 submissions
that each alleged more than $2 million in tax noncompliance, twentyfour of which alleged more than $10 million. 6 1 The increased efficacy of
tax fraud from its purview. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(e) (2006) (stating that the FCA
"does not apply to claims, records, or statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986").
56. See Gleeson, supra note 4 (commenting that Congress "consciously modeled" the SEC
whistleblower program on the updated IRS program begun in 2007). See also Letter from H. David
Kotz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, to Representative Paul E. Kanjorski, Chairman,
U.S. House Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov't-Sponsored Enters. (June 30, 2009),
available at http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2009/07/01/sec-ig-kotz-responds-to-rep-kanjorskiwith-legislative-suggestions-to-improve-sec/ (recommending that Congress consider amending the
Exchange Act to provide specific criteria for awarding bounties in connection with information
leading to the recovery of civil penalties from violators of the federal securities laws and to
authorize the SEC to make such awards).
57. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, § 406(b), 120 Stat. at 2958-59 (codified at I.R.C
§ 7623(b) (2006)).
58. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1). Under the new mandatory award program, whistleblowers who
bring information to the IRS (i) relating to a tax noncompliance matter in which the tax, penalties,
interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in dispute exceed $2 million or (ii) relating to a
taxpayer (and for individual taxpayers only) whose gross income exceeds $200,000 for at least one
of the tax years in question, are eligible to receive between fifteen to thirty percent of the amount
collected. Id.§ 7623(b)(1), (5).
59.

I.R.S., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 2 (2008) [hereinafter I.R.S.

ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblower_annual
report.pdf. The IRS Whistleblower Office is generally responsible for managing and tracking
whistleblower claims, including analyzing submitted information and making award determinations,
and has the authority to investigate matters itself or to assign them to an appropriate IRS office. Id.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 4-5.
60. See History of the Whistleblower/lInformant Program, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/
compliance/article/0,,id=181294,00.html (last updated Apr. 21, 2008). Prior to passage of the Tax
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 and the attendant revisions to the Code, the IRS solely
administered a discretionary award program, the particulars of which were re-designated in Section
7623(a). Id.The discretionary award program, providing for a maximum award of fifteen percent of
collected taxes and penalties (up to $10 million), still applies to whistleblower information
concerning taxes, penalties, interest, and other amounts in dispute below a certain dollar threshold,
and to cases involving individual, noncompliant taxpayers below a certain gross income level. I.R.C.
§ 7623(b)(1), (5).
61. I.R.S. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 3-4. Section 406(c) of the Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006 mandates that the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury conduct an annual study
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the informant program 62 has much to do with the addition of mandatory
awards to the IRS's already-existing discretionary awards. 63 The socalled "strong form" bounty provisions 64 further encourage would-be
informants to come forward with information based, in part, on the
relative certainty concerning the benefit of doing so. 65 As of the end of
fiscal year 2010, the IRS received an aggregate 1328 submissions
concerning 9532 taxpayers. 16 In April 2011, the IRS Whistleblower
Office paid out its first Section 7623(b) award, of more than $4.5
million, to an in-house accountant of a national financial services firm
who assisted the IRS in recovering $20 million in unpaid taxes from his
employer.67
What does the increased information flow stemming from the
revised IRS Whistleblower/Informant Program tell us about the potential
efficacy of the newly-created SEC Whistleblower Office? 68 On the one
for submission to Congress on the use of Section 7623 and the results obtained, detailing therein any
legislative or administrative recommendations for Section 7623 and its application. Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006, § 406(c), 120 Stat. at 2960.
62. I.R.S. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 4-5 (stating that under the previous
discretionary whistleblower award program, "only 12 of 227 full paid claims in 2007 involved
collections of more than $2 million, and only 3 involved collections of more than $10 million").
63. Id. at 1-2.
64. Gleeson, supra note 4; see generally Rapp, supra note 38 (discussing "bounty"
provisions).
65. Once a whistleblower fulfills the requirements set forth in Section 7623(b) and the
information furnished is deemed to have "substantially contributed" to the IRS's detection and
recovery of amounts from a noncompliant taxpayer, the IRS is obligated, with certain exceptions, to
pay the individual a reward of between fifteen to thirty percent of the amount collected, with no
limit on the dollar amount of the award. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(l)-(3). See also IRM 25.2.2.7 (June
18, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm 25-002-002.html#d0e589 (discussing the
processing of a claim for a Section 7623 award).
66. See I.R.S., FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF SECTION 7623,
at 7 tbl.1 (2010) [hereinafter I.R.S. FY 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
whistleblower/annual reporttocongress fy 2010.pdf. Award payments related to such
information have been much less fruitful, explained in part by the IRS's processing backlog: As of
April 2011, sixty-six percent of claims submitted in the first two years of the program, fiscal years
2007 and 2008, were still in process. See GAO REPORT, supra note 52, at 8.
67. See MaryClaire Dale, IRS Awards $4.5M to Whistleblower, USA TODAY (Apr. 8,
2011, 3:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2011-04-08-irs-whistleblower-taxesreward.htm.
68. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 924(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1850 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(d) (Supp. IV 2011)). The
SEC's Office of the Whistleblower (i) handles whistleblower tips and complaints, (ii) provides
guidance to SEC Enforcement Division staff, and (iii) assists the SEC in determining the size of
awards for each whistleblower. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON
THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2011) [hereinafter SEC
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-report-

2011 .pdf (explaining the various functions of the SEC's Office of the Whistleblower). The SEC's
Office of the Whistleblower has a stand-alone webpage which promotes and clarifies the
whistleblower program and provides guidance on the same. See SEC Office of the Whistleblower,
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hand, not all information furnished to enforcement authorities is as it
purports to be: Owing to incomplete verification of informant tips
concerning taxpayer noncompliance as of the printing of any given
annual report, the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury readily admits that the
number of cases reported as submitted to the mandatory Section 7623(b)
informant program changes from year to year. 69 Furthermore, there is
some concern that the IRS cannot currently handle the volume of
whistleblower information it receives in a timely manner. 70 Regardless
of the particular utility of the IRS whistleblower program as a means of
increasing compliance with, in that instance, federal tax law, companies
grappling with the new SEC whistleblower program should be focusing
on how to preserve the integrity of their corporate compliance programs
and internal control structures, and strengthen internal investigation
protocols-in short, how to retain access to internal whistleblower
information before it is turned over to federal law enforcement.
B. The SEC's FinalRules and New Whistleblower Program
The Dodd-Frank Act was promulgated, in part, to ameliorate certain
perceived shortcomings of whistleblower incentive awards and
protections 7' erected pursuant to the carrot-for-the-whistleblower, stickfor-the-company approach to combating fraud as found in the FCA and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.72 Setting the backdrop for what has become one
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
69. See I.R.S. FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 66, at 7 n.12 (stating that the classification of a
particular submission as a potential Section 7623(b) case, and the number of taxpayers identified,
can change as additional information is developed, and as such, "the numbers for a particular fiscal
year included in previous annual reports do not match the numbers reported").
70. See Letter from Charles E. Grassley, supra note 52, at 2 (Senator Grassley expressed
concern over the Government Accountability Office's data that suggests that whistleblower
information spends "years of languishing in a review to determine whether a taxpayer should be
even audited. The numbers in audit for these years are more troubling.").
71. Critics have noted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's whistleblower protections have fallen far
short of their promise. See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L.
REv. 1757, 1764 (2007) (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "gives the illusion of protection
without truly meaningful opportunities or remedies for achieving it"); Richard E. Moberly,
Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely
Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65, 94-95 (2007). For a discussion of potential FCA qui tam abuses,
see Baruch & Barr, supra note 23, at 30 (noting the potential for "whistleblower abuses under the
qui tam enforcement mechanism," citing, among other things, that while the FCA provides that "a
prevailing relator's attorneys' fees are paid by the defendant, a prevailing defendant may recover
reasonable attorneys' fees only if the qui tam action was clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought in
bad faith under the FCA"). See also False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) (2006) ("[T]he court
may award to the defendant its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses if the defendant prevails in
the action and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing the action was clearly frivolous,
clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment.").
72. See Baruch & Barr, supra note 23, at 29-30; CorporateLaw, supranote 7, at 1829-30.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:367

of the most successful private party-governmental enforcement
collaborations to date,73 the 1986 amendments to the FCA, among other
things, expanded liability to persons with "deliberate ignorance" or
"reckless disregard" of the veracity of information contained in a claim
submitted to the federal government, and encouraged the submission of
whistleblower information by trebling damages and increasing awards
for successful qui tam relators.74
While the Dodd-Frank Act did not authorize qui tam enforcement
of federal securities laws, it fashioned a whistleblower bounty scheme
which prizes cooperation with, and disclosure to, the SEC-potentially
entirely in lieu of an enterprise's internal compliance remediation.75
Following the Dodd-Frank Act directive set forth in Section 922(a),76 the
SEC's final rules allow for awards of between ten to thirty percent of
collected monetary sanctions 77 to whistleblowers who (i) voluntarily
provide the SEC (ii) with original information about a violation of the
securities laws (iii) that leads to the successful enforcement of an action
brought by the SEC (iv) resulting in monetary sanctions exceeding $1
million.78 Parsing the various elements of such award criteria, the SEC
defines a "whistleblower" as any individual 79 who provides information
to the SEC regarding a "possible violation" of the federal securities laws
that "has occurred, is ongoing, or [that] is about to occur."' As such, the
list of possible whistleblowers is long, including individuals such as
73. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement
Efforts Recover Record $4 Billion; New Affordable Care Act Tools Will Help Fight Fraud (Jan. 24,
2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 11/January/l l-asg-094.html. See also HCFAC FY 2010
REPORT, supra note 27, at 5 ("$4.021 billion was deposited with the Department of the Treasury and
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ....).
74. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, sec. 2, § 3729(a)-(b), 100
Stat. 3153, 3153-54 (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
Unlike the FCA, the Dodd-Frank Act does not provide for treble damages concerning violations of
the Exchange Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, sec. 922, § 21F(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1842 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (Supp. IV

2011)).
75. See Baruch & Barr, supra note 23, at 29-30, 41.
76. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841.
77. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,366 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
78. Id.at 34,363.
79. Importantly, and in contrast with the expansively permissive definition ofa qui tam relator
pursuant to the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006), the SEC expressly excludes companies and other
entities from the definition of an eligible whistleblower. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,363. Pursuant to SEC Rule 21F7(b), an individual may anonymously report to the SEC, though he or she must have attorney
representation and follow the procedures delineated in SEC Rule 21F-9. Id.at 34,367.
80. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. at 34,363.
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employees and former employees, third-party vendors and contractors,
agents, clients, customers, and even company competitors. 8'
Mirroring FCA qui tam relator exclusions,82 among those excluded
from award eligibility are individuals who (i) are convicted of a criminal
violation related to the SEC action or to a "related action" for which the
individual otherwise would receive a reward 83 or (ii) obtain the
information relayed to the SEC by a means or in a manner "determined
by a United States court to violate applicable Federal or state criminal
law. 84 The final rules also exclude certain categories of persons as being
incapable of conveying "original information" due to the fact that they
obtained their information through the commission of preexisting duties
and, as such, lack the "independent knowledge" or "independent
analysis" of the information.
81. Following the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower exclusions set forth in Section 922(a), the
final SEC rules do exclude from bounty eligibility persons falling into certain categories, including,
but not limited to, individuals who (i) are, or were at the time the original information was acquired,
(a) employed at certain governmental or law enforcement agencies or (b) foreign government
officials; (ii) acquired the original information through audit work of the company's financials; or
(iii) are related or in the same household as an SEC member or employee. Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,367-68.
82. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3). Courts have discretion to reduce a relator's
share of the qui tam recovery when that relator is found to have "planned and initiated the [FCA]
violation." Id.In addition, qui tam awards cannot be collected by relators convicted of criminal
conduct related to the qui tam action. Id.Similarly, the SEC has discretion to reduce an award to a
whistleblower who is deemed to have a certain degree of "culpability or involvement ... in matters
associated with the [SEC's] action or related actions." Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,366-67. The SEC will also take
into consideration whistleblower culpability when determining the $1 million threshold set forth in
SEC Rule 21F-10, subtracting from such dollar threshold monetary sanctions (i) payable by the
whistleblower or (ii) payable by any entity whose liability is "based substantially on conduct that the
whistleblower directed, planned, or initiated." Id.at 34,371.
83. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. at 34,367-68.
84. Id.at 34,364-65. The FCA has no similar prohibition concerning qui tam relators. See
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) ("If the person bringing the action is convicted of criminal
conduct arising from his or her role in the violation of section 3729, that person shall be dismissed
from the civil action and shall not receive any share of the proceeds of the action.").
85. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. at 34,364. Among the individuals excluded by the rule are officers, directors, and
trustees; employees whose "principal duties" involve compliance or internal audit responsibilities,
including employees of firms charged with performing such functions; individuals retained to
conduct an inquiry or investigation into possible violations of law; and auditors who obtain their
information through the performance of an engagement required of an independent public
accountant under the federal securities laws. Id. However, any such individual may provide
"original information" if: (i) he or she has a reasonable basis to believe that disclosure of the
information is necessary to prevent "substantial injury" to the financial interest or property of the
entity or investors; (ii) he or she has a reasonable basis to believe that the company is engaging in
conduct that will impede an investigation of the misconduct; or (iii) at least 120 days have elapsed
since the individual either provided the information to the company's compliance, legal, or audit
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The SEC's administration of the whistleblower program will, of
course, depend on interpretation of several key elements of the final
rules. The final rules contain definitions clarifying what it means to,
among other things, "voluntarily" provide "original information" which
"leads to successful enforcement" by the SEC of an "action" involving
"monetary sanctions. 8 6 In an effort to clarify award criteria, the SEC's
Office of the Whistleblower set up a webpage covering basic procedural
information such as how to submit a tip and how to go about claiming an
award. 87 While a discussion of possible criteria interpretation is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the award program
ratcheted up incentives for would-be whistleblowers to tell what they
know.
As anyone familiar with the growing pains of adapting to a
Sarbanes-Oxley-mandated compliance regime would ask, the most
pressing question is not who qualifies to receive a whistleblower reward
but, rather, will whistleblowers choose to report internally or externally?
In a hotly contested debate concerning whether to require whistleblowers
to report up before reporting out, the prerequisite was deemed
unnecessary: While an SEC whistleblower is permitted and, indeed,
rewarded for participating in internal compliance programs,88 internal
reporting is not required in order to be considered for an award.89 Issuing
a staff recommendation in favor of the final rules to SEC commissioners,
SEC Enforcement Director Robert S. Khuzami explained that the SEC
weighed the possibility of conditioning awards on internal reporting and
"concluded that an absolute requirement that whistleblowers report
internally ... would be detrimental to the enforcement program, and
seemingly inconsistent with the statute's goal of motivating individuals
personnel or received such information under circumstances indicating that such company personnel
were already aware of the information. Id. at 34,365.
86. Id at 34,364-65.
87. Claim an Award, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/owb/owb-awards.shtml; Submit a Tip, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, www.sec.gov/about/
offices/owb/owb-tips.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2012).
88. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. at 34,366. In exercising its discretion to determine the appropriate award percentage
owed to a whistleblower, the SEC looks favorably on the whistleblower's participation in internal
compliance systems, including reporting possible securities violations through whistleblower, legal,
or compliance procedures before, or contemporaneously as, reporting them to the SEC. Id. In similar
fashion, the SEC's award calculation will take into account whether a whistleblower "undermined
the integrity" of internal compliance and reporting systems. Id. at 34,367.
89. See id. at 34,365. Whistleblowers may be eligible for an award for information initially
reported internally if they also report the information to the SEC within 120 days of such internal
reporting. Id. In addition, a whistleblower who initially reports internally and whose company
thereafter self-reports to the SEC receives credit for the self-reported information in addition to his
or her own information. Id.
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to come to the [SEC] with evidence of securities law violations. 9 °
Whether the final rules will be effective in encouraging whistleblowers
to first report internally-and, indeed, effective in bringing securities
violations information to the SEC itself-remains to be seen. 91
Congress was not confident that upping the potential rewards would
be enough of a sweetener to properly motivate whistleblowers to turn
information over to the government. Instead, relators and others were
granted certain anti-retaliation whistleblower protections 9 2 -the stick
against companies who would seek to quash government informants
through intimidation, harassment, and discharging-protections which
were strengthened in 200993 and, most recently, pursuant to the DoddFrank Act. Improving upon the FCA's anti-retaliation protections, the

90. Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by
SEC Staff: Remarks at Open Meeting-Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch05251 lrk.htm [hereinafter Khuzami Recommendation].
See also Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. at 34,323 (explaining its decision not to require internal reporting by noting that the
SEC's "primary goal, consistent with the congressional intent behind Section 21F, is to encourage
the submission of high-quality information to facilitate the effectiveness and efficiency of the
[SEC's] enforcement program").
91. As required by Section 21F(g)(5) of the Exchange Act, the SEC issued an annual report on
the whistleblower program. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 922, § 21F(g)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1844-45 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(g)(5) (Supp. IV 2011)). Among other information, the report is required to contain statistics on the
SEC whistleblower program, including a description of the number of whistleblower awards granted
and the types of cases in which the awards were granted during the preceding fiscal year. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(i). In November 2011, the SEC issued the requisite
report for fiscal year 2011 and the whistleblower program's impact is still unclear. See SEC
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 6 ("[lIt is too early to identify any specific trends or conclusions
from the data collected to date.").
92. The FCA amendments of 1986 granted employees the right to sue their employers based
on a good faith belief that they were being discriminated against-including being discharged,
demoted, suspended, threatened, or harassed-and to seek to be made whole, including, but not
limited to, reinstatement with same seniority status and two times the amount of any back pay. False
Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, sec. 4, § 3730(h), 100 Stat. 3153, 3157-58
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006 & Supp. 1V 2011)). The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
related to the 1986 FCA amendments makes clear the congressional intent behind the legislation:
The Committee recognizes that few individuals will expose fraud if they fear their
disclosures will lead to harassment, demotion, loss of employment, or any other form of
retaliation.... [T]he Committee seeks to halt companies and individuals from using the
threat of economic retaliation to silence "whistleblowers", as well as assure those who
may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected from retaliatory acts.
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 34 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5299.
93. Pursuant to the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, the anti-retaliation
protections afforded in the 1986 FCA amendments were further expanded to protect "lawful acts
done by the employee, contractor, or agent on behalf of the employee, contractor, or agent or
associated others in furtherance of other efforts to stop [one] or more violations of [the FCA]."
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, sec. 4(d), § 3730(h), 123 Stat.
1617, 1624-25 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).
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Dodd-Frank Act expands protected conduct to include lawful acts done
by "the employee, contractor, or agent or associated others in
furtherance of other efforts to stop [one] or more violations of this
subchapter." 94 The Dodd-Frank Act likewise augments the
whistleblower protections contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
including (i) broadening Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to
include employees of private subsidiaries and affiliates of publicly
traded companies "whose financial information is included in the
consolidated financial statements of such compan[ies]"; 95 (ii) doubling
the statute of limitations to 180 days; 96 and (iii) explicitly disallowing
any "agreement, policy form, or condition of employment, including by
a predispute arbitration agreement," which purports to waive
whistleblower rights or remedies of Section 922(c) of the Dodd-Frank
Act. 97
Commentators have made remarks concerning the Dodd-Frank
Act's two-tiered system of retaliation protection specifically afforded the
SEC whistleblower. 98 As set forth in new Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the
Exchange Act, employers may not "discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower" in (i)
providing information to the SEC, (ii) initiating, testifying in, or
assisting in any SEC investigation or action based upon or related to
such information, or (iii) making disclosures that are required or
protected under any law, rule, or regulation subject to SEC jurisdiction. 99
94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec.
1079A(c), § 3730(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2079 (2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Section 1079A(c) also clarifies that individuals are afforded a three-year period for actions
brought under Section 3730(h) of the FCA, clarifying the statute of limitations following the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in GrahamCounty Soil & Water Conservation Districtv. United States ex
rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 422 (2005), which applied an analogous state statute of limitations for
wrongful discharge actions to FCA retaliation claims. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act sec. 1079(A)(c), § 3730(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 2079.
95. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 929A, § 1514A, 124
Stat. at 1852 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
96. Id sec. 922(c), § 1514A(b)(2), 124 Stat, at 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)).
The limitations period starts on the date on which the employee becomes aware of the employer's
retaliatory conduct, as opposed to the date the retaliation occurred. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
Section 922 also clarifies that employees are entitled to have their retaliation claims tried before a
jury. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 922(c), § 1514A(b)(2), 124
Stat. at 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(E)).
97. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act sec. 922(c), § 1514A(b)(2),
124 Stat. at 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)).
98. See, e.g., CorporateLaw, supra note 7, at 1830-32.
99. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1845-
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Echoing the strongest criticism leveled against the new SEC
whistleblower rules, as discussed in more detail below, a strict
interpretation of the wording of Section 922 of the Dodd Frank Actand, more specifically, the definition of the term "whistleblower t00 would indicate that Congress meant to bolster the anti-retaliation rights
of whistleblowers reporting externally to the SEC, but not those 10of
individuals providing information to internal compliance departments.t
C. Public Backlash and the Future of SEC Whistleblower Reporting
Legal observers, as well as critics within legal and business
communities, have analyzed the SEC's whistleblower program at
length-both following the SEC's publication of proposed rules for
public comment 10 2 and, most recently, when the SEC adopted final rules
concerning Section 21F of the Exchange Act. On the heels of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's mandate to erect internal compliance systems and
controls designed to detect and deter financial fraud, requirements which
turned out to be much more expensive than originally estimated, 0 3 the
46 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2011)). Enforcement of this anti-retaliation
measure is found in new section 21F(h)(1)(B), which creates a private right of action for individuals
alleging a violation thereof. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(l)(B) (Supp. IV
2011).
100, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1842
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (Supp. V 2011)) (defining a whistleblower as "any individual
who provides, or [two] or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the [SEC]").
101. Despite the apparent intent of Congress to create disparate anti-retaliation rights as
between internal- and external-reporting whistleblowers, in a case of first impression in the federal
courts, Section 21F(h)(1)(A) has recently been broadly interpreted to protect internal whistleblowers
who provide certain disclosures under law, rule, or regulation subject to the SEC's jurisdiction. See
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., [2011 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,307 (May 4,
2011), complaint dismissed, 2011 WL 4344067 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011) (distinguishing between
the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower reward provisions and its anti-retaliation provisions, and
opining that the latter apply to whistleblowers claiming either that their information (i) was reported
to the SEC or (ii) fell under the four categories of disclosures delineated by 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii) that do not require such reporting under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Exchange Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. IV 2011), or other laws and regulations subject to the jurisdiction of the
SEC).
102. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488 (Nov.
17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). The SEC reports that it received more than 240
comment letters and approximately 1300 form letters on the Whistleblower Proposed Rules. SEC
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 2-3. Those comments are available at the SEC's website.
Comments on ProposedRules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. CO ,A'N,http://www.sec.gov/comments/s733-10/s73310.shtml (last updated May 24, 2011).
103. Joseph A. Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner, Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1645
(2007) (citing the SEC's estimated average cost of compliance with Section 404 as $91,000,
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overwhelming critique centers around the SEC's deliberate decision not
to make internal reporting a prerequisite to obtaining whistleblower
award bounties.' °4 As reported by SEC Enforcement Director Khuzami,
public comment regarding the lack of mandatory internal reporting noted
that the whistleblower program would, among other things:
"
*

*
*

Encourage whistleblowers to bypass internal compliance
programs;
Undermine the ability of an entity to detect, investigate, and
remediate securities violations, particularly as to those
complaints over which the [SEC] has no jurisdiction or that
are too small for the [SEC] to investigate;
Create adverse incentives for whistleblowers to see their
companies sanctioned or to delay reporting potential
violations; and
Reduce the incentive for corporations to establish and
maintain effective internal compliance programs.105

whereas a 2005 survey revealed the direct cost for first year compliance at $7.3 million for large
accelerated filers and $1.5 million for accelerated filers).
104. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Barbara Hackman Franklin, Chairman, Nat'l Ass'n of
Corporate Dirs., and Kenneth Daly, President & CEO, Nat'l Ass'n of Corporate Dirs., to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 4 (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.nacdonline.org/
("[T]he
files/FileDownloads/PDF/SEC%20Whistleblower/2OComment/2OLetter/2ONACD.pdf
proposed rule incentivizes employees to be whistleblowers first and loyal employees
second.... [T]here is little motivation or reason for a company to build an effective internal
compliance system if the corporate employees are not expected to use it and can bypass it at
anytime."); Comment Letter from Neila B. Radin, Chair, Sec. Law Comm., Soc'y of Corporate
Sec'ys & Governance Prof'ls, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Dec.
17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-230.pdf ("[C]ompliance and hot line
programs and policies generally require employees to internally report any potential violations of
law.... It is important that the Rules work in tandem with, and not in contravention of, these
processes and procedures."); Comment Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, Comm. on Fed.
Regulation of Sec., Am. Bar Ass'n Bus. Law Section, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n 16 (Jan. 4, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000pub/
comments/20110104000000.pdf ("The Committees believe that in order for whistleblowers to be
eligible for an award, whistleblowers should be required, absent extraordinary circumstances, to
exercise reasonable efforts to exhaust all reasonably available internal processes a company has
established for reporting compliance concerns.").
105. Khuzami Recommendation, supra note 90. SEC Enforcement Director Khuzami
countered such objections by noting that (i) the SEC was not presented with, or otherwise aware of,
empirical data showing that the absence of mandatory internal reporting would undermine internal
compliance programs, (ii) "companies that take their fiduciary obligations and corporate citizenship
responsibilities seriously will design and implement effective compliance programs regardless of
whether a whistleblower is required to internally report wrongdoers to qualify for an award," (iii)
Congress intended the Dodd-Frank Act to be utilized as a tool to increase the effectiveness of the
SEC's enforcement program, and (iv) nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act requires internal reporting as a
condition of award eligibility. Id.
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Assuming for the moment that the whistleblower program will be
effective, at least in the functional sense that it is capable of either
minimizing ongoing corporate criminality or deterring it altogether, the
next analysis concerns whether the costs of complying with such a
regime-including the possibility that whistleblowers will report
malfeasance to the SEC rather than internally-are worth the benefits of
increased information flow to the SEC. To that end, SEC commissioners
rightly questioned whether the cost-benefit analysis not only properly
weighed the risk to companies, insofar as whistleblowers might choose
to forego internal compliance regimes erected pursuant to the SarbanesOxley Act, but perhaps also overestimated the SEC's role in the process
itself.106
Arguing that a central purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act's
whistleblower mandate is to supply the SEC with insider information,
SEC Enforcement Director Khuzami predicted:
[I]nformation from whistleblowers will allow us to build stronger cases
and move more quickly, thus increasing the chance of stopping frauds
early, of locating and returning more money to victim-investors, and of
preventing small frauds from growing into big er frauds with even
more victims, more losses and more ruined lives.
Critics opine that precisely the opposite results are most likely to be
derived from the Dodd-Frank Act's incentives for whistleblowers:
Whistleblowers will sit on information until the fraud becomes large
enough to maximize their reward and, as a consequence, money that
could have been saved for victim-investors will instead be paid to the
government in fines and penalties and to the whistleblower.108

106. See Casey Dissent, supra note 34. Noting that "the public investigative process can be
substantially more ponderous and time-consuming than private investigative processes," former
SEC Commissioner Casey warned that "[b]y diverting tips and complaints from private channels to
the [SEC], we may end up permitting violations to last longer and grow more serious." Id.
107. Khuzami Recommendation, supra note 90.
108. See Harvey L. Pitt, Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the
United States Senate Banking Committee on "Enhanced Investor Protection After the Financial
Crisis" 8 (July 12, 2011), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Files.View&FileStoreid=25ebfOf-03ca-481c-94lb-4f42b14b76f2. Pitt generally criticized the
Dodd-Frank Act and, with specific reference to the SEC whistleblower program, stated that the
implementing rules:
[C]reate overwhelming financial incentives to bypass internal reporting mechanisms and
requirements, and go directly to the SEC with [whistleblower] tips. As a result, they may
effectively deny companies the opportunity to detect and take prompt remedial action in
response to internally reported tips from employees.... By diverting tips and complaints
from internal compliance and legal channels to the SEC, the whistleblower provisions
paradoxically may result in violations continuing and becoming more serious.
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Furthermore, the SEC may not have the necessary resources to deal
with the projected new influx of cases generated by whistleblowers.
According to the SEC, the agency has "successfully resolved" ninetytwo percent of the 681 enforcement cases brought in 2010.109 However,
is the SEC prepared to handle the estimated 30,000 tips it anticipates to
receive yearly? 10 SEC Chairman Schapiro recently wrote concerning an
organizational assessment of the SEC, mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act
111
and conducted by the Boston Consulting Group, Inc. (the "BCG").
Rather than providing comfort, the BCG report underscores the SEC's
"significant opportunity to further optimize its available resources,"
providing sixteen discrete recommendations organized around (among
three other categories) reshaping the organization. 12 In the words of
SEC Chairman Schapiro, the SEC has "more work to do."' " 13 If that is
indeed the case-that the SEC will be swamped with more complaints
than it can handle-the lack of a requirement for internal reporting will
allow fraud that would otherwise have been reported to continue
unabated until the SEC can find the time to address it. Likely, this will
be most harmful to investors in smaller enterprises and those least
scrutinized by the markets and media, since, like all other enforcement
authorities, the SEC will target the worst-in this context, the biggestoffenders first.
By not conditioning whistleblower rewards on initial reporting to
internal compliance, the Dodd-Frank Act may also motivate would-be
whistleblowers to act as a secret police force, of sorts, for the
government. This secret police will not be bound by the Constitution as
federal authorities would be. Therefore, whistleblowers potentially could
be collecting documents, reporting on conversations, and acquiring4
evidence that would be beyond the reach of subpoenas and warrants. 1
109.

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11,

27, 49 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf#2010review (defining
successful resolution of an action as one "result[ing] in a favorable outcome for the SEC, including
through litigation, a settlement, or the issuance of a default judgment").
110. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,354 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
111. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 967, 124 Stat. 1376, 1913-14 (2010); Bos. CONSULTING GRP., INC., U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE

COMMISSION:

ORGANIZATIONAL

STUDY

AND

REFORM

(2011),

available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/967study.pdf; Mary L. Schapiro, Fixing the Watchdog:
Evaluatingand Improving the SEC, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 2,
2011, 9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/10/02/fixing-the-watchdog-evaluatingand-improving-the-sec/.
112. BOS. CONSULTING GRP., INC., supra note 111, at 5-8, 141-42; Schapiro, supranote 111.
113. Schapiro, supra note I 11.
114. See, e.g., Gundacker v. Unisys Corp., 151 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that a
document found to be privileged by the magistrate judge, a holding affirmed by the district court,
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These issues are not unique to the whistleblower provisions of the DoddFrank Act, but are exacerbated by the lack of a requirement that
disclosures first be made internally.
The most direct and impactful criticism of the whistleblower
program comes from Congress in the form of pending legislation that
has the potential to radically change the whistleblower program as
currently designed. Among other things, the Whistleblower
Improvement Act of 2011115 would: (i) require corporate whistleblower
employees to first report suspected violations of securities laws to their
employer before reporting the information to the SEC; (ii) expand the
current exclusion of eligible whistleblowers; and (iii) mandate that the
SEC notify entities prior to commencing any whistleblower-related
enforcement action to afford an opportunity to investigate and remedy
the alleged misconduct.1 6 Whether the SEC whistleblower program ends
up being revised, through self-study, congressional action, or a
combination of the two, companies should carefully examine their
internal compliance programs with an eye toward preventing, detecting,
and deterring fraud, and increasing the odds that individuals with
information to share will do so internally in the first instance.
V.

NOTABLE, BIG-MONEY WHISTLEBLOWER CASES

While we do not have a concrete sense of the volume of
whistleblower tips flowing to the SEC or of the resulting bounties paid
for such information,117 the public need not wait to understand the
astronomically high numbers involved in federal enforcement cases
assisted by private informants. Consider just a few names you might find
in your medicine cabinet: Botox®, GlaxoSmithKline, AstraZeneca,
Pfizer, Eli Lilly, and Merck. The unfortunate commonality among such
companies and brands is that they all paid huge sums-altogether, some
$3.795 billion"l-to resolve civil charges brought by the federal
had to be returned to the defendant, but the plaintiff was allowed to proceed with the underlying
claim).
115. Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. (2011).
116. See id. §§ 2(a)(1), (e)(3), 3(c).
117. See SEC ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 68, at 6.
118. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600
Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox® (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2010/09/Allergan-News-Release.pdf [hereinafter Allergan to Pay
$600 Million]; Eli Lilly to Pay $1.415 Billion, supra note 3; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty & Pay $750 Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil Liability
Regarding Manufacturing Deficiencies at Puerto Rico Plant (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/
opalpr/2010/October/10-civ-1205.html [hereinafter GlaxoSmithKline to Pay $750 Million]; Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement
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government concerning false claims submitted to federal and state health
care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. What is more, four of the
six companies involved paid an additionalaggregate $2.4 billion in fines
and forfeitures to settle criminal liability associated with the same
activity." 9 All told, the DOJ collected "$3 billion in civil settlements and
judgments in cases involving fraud against the government in the fiscal
year ending Sept. 30, 2010," with $2.5 billion of such amount
representing health care fraud recoveries-the largest in DOJ history. 20
A.

IncreasedDOJReliance on Whistleblowers

According to the DOJ, the FCA is the federal government's
"primary weapon in the battle against fraud."' 2' Moreover, the driving
force behind the settlements, criminal fines, and forfeitures is the insider
22
information provided by qui tam whistleblowers to the government.
Once the DOJ receives insider tips of illegality-information that
arguably might not have been discovered by enforcement authorities on
their own-the investigative road is straight and swift, with the
defendant company left to investigate the wrongdoing one step behind
123
law enforcement already privy to the whistleblower information.

in Its History: Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion for Fraudulent Marketing (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/Pfizer/Pfizer/20-%20PR%20%28Final%29.pdf
[hereinafter
Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merck to Pay More than $650
Million to Resolve Claims of Fraudulent Price Reporting and Kickbacks (Feb. 7, 2008),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/February/08_civ_094.html [hereinafter Merck to Pay $650
Million]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pharmaceutical Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520
Million for Off-Label Drug Marketing (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/
I 0-civ-487.html [hereinafter AstraZeneca to Pay $520 Million].
119. See Allergan to Pay $600 Million, supra note 118; Eli Lilly to Pay $1.415 Billion, supra
note 3; GlaxoSmithKline to Pay $750 Million, supra note 118; Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion, supra note
118. In the case of these enforcement actions, the criminal fines primarily related to "off-label"
marketing by the pharmaceutical manufacturers-that is, the marketing of a drug for a use not
included in the drug's Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved product label. Allergan to
Pay $600 Million, supranote 118; Eli Lilly to Pay $1.415 Billion, supranote 3; GlaxoSmithKline to
Pay $750 Million, supra note 118; Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion, supra note 118. Under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 to 399d (2006 & Supp. IV 2011), "a company in
its application to the FDA must specify each intended use of a biological product. After the FDA
approves the product as safe and effective for a specified use, any promotion by the manufacturer
for other uses-known as 'off-label' uses-[is illegal and] renders the product misbranded."
Allergan to Pay $600 Million, supra note 118.
120. Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion, supra note 19.
121. Id.
122. See Barger et al., supranote 13, at 477-78 (stating that qui tam provisions are "[k]ey to the
FCA's success"); Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion, supra note 19 (discussing the revision
of the FCA's qui tam provisions and their importance to particular recoveries).
123. See Barger et al., supranote 13, at 475; Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra
note 35.
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Fraud enforcement, and more specifically health care fraud enforcement,
is a clear priority of the federal government, and such activity has
increasingly relied on the private citizen informant-for-hire-the
corporate whistleblower. 12 4 Employees, former employees, outside
parties such as vendors and contractors, and clients-any and all of these
individuals could uncover potentially incriminating information against
the corporation, and the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower provisions, as
effectuated through the SEC's new Whistleblower Office, represent yet
additional evidence that public law enforcement has come to
increasingly rely on eyes and ears within the corporate walls to ferret out
wrongdoing.
More than just a testament to the government's growing use of
whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank Act is also a harbinger of the expanding
use of whistleblowers across industries-in this case, to any entity that
must concern itself with following the federal securities laws. Indeed,
while the natural result of the DOJ's particular focus on health care fraud
is that many of the high-profile qui tam actions involve companies in the
pharmaceutical and medical device sectors, consider that $500 million in
fiscal year 2010 alone was recovered from companies in other
industries. 125 For instance, in October 2011, Oracle Corporation and
Oracle America Inc. agreed to pay nearly $200 million plus interest to
resolve allegations concerning contractual negotiations with the General
Services Administration (the "GSA"). 126 The success of the DOJ's use of
124. See Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion, supra note 19; Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2.4 Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2009;
More than $24 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/
09-civ-1253.html ("Of the $2.4 billion in settlements and judgments obtained in fiscal year 2009,
nearly $2 billion was recovered in lawsuits filed under the [FCA's] qui tam provisions."); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, More than $1 Billion Recovered by Justice Department in Fraud and
False Claims in Fiscal Year 2008 (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/
08-civ-992.html (noting that almost seventy-eight percent of fiscal year 2008 recoveries of $1.34
billion were associated with qui tam actions); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States
Files Complaint Against BestCare Laboratory Services Alleging False Claims for Medicare Funds
(Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/November/11 -civ-1523.html.
125. See Department of Justice Recovers $3 Billion, supranote 19.
126. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oracle Agrees to Pay U.S. $199.5 Million to
Resolve False Claims Act Lawsuit (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 1/October/lIciv-1329.html (disclosing that the single qui tam relator involved, a former Oracle Corporation
employee, will receive a $40 million reward for his information). Oracle Corporation is hardly the
lone high-tech company to become embroiled in an FCA enforcement action with the GSA. In April
2009, NetApp Inc. and NetApp U.S. Public Sector Inc. agreed to pay $128 million plus interest to
resolve claims that the companies had failed to properly disclose product discounts to the GSA
during the course of contract negotiations. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, GSA Contractor
NetApp Agrees to Pay U.S. $128 Million to Resolve Contract Fraud Allegations (Apr. 15, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-civ-353.html (disclosing that the single qui tam relator
involved, a former employee, will receive a $19.2 million reward for his information).
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the FCA's qui tam provisions marks a seemingly new breed of
prosecutors: 127 private citizens with access to the intricacies of business
operations across America who stand ready, willing, and able to assist
the government in performing its duty of detecting, deterring, and
minimizing corporate fraud and malfeasance. 128 The passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower provisions is simply an affirmation of the
congressional vote of confidence in the private-public law enforcement
partnership that developed, in large measure, following the 1986 qui tam
amendments and was later
reaffirmed through the revamped IRS
29
1
program.
award
informant
B. Rising Bounties, Rising EnterpriseRisk
Just as the lure of billions flowing back to the U.S. Treasury with
the help of whistleblowers enticed Congress to act, so too does the
prospect of big-money bounties spur whistleblowers to direct
information to law enforcement.130 The sums, particularly those
involving health care fraud actions, are almost as striking as the amounts
recovered by the DOJ. Awards given to qui tam relators in connection
with the six pharmaceutical companies previously mentioned include: (i)
$102 million to six whistleblowers in the September 2009 Pfizer
settlement, with a single relator receiving $51.5 million of the award;'31
(ii) more than $45 million to a single whistleblower in the April 2010
AstraZeneca settlement; 132 (iii) $37.8 million to five whistleblowers in
the September 2010 Allergan Botox®-related settlement; 133 (iv) nearly
$79 million to nine whistleblowers in the January 2009 Eli Lilly
settlement; 134 (v) $96 million to a single whistleblower in the October

127. Commentators have observed this phenomenon at length. See, e.g., Dayna Bowen
Matthew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted Claims: The Law, Economics, and Ethics of Fighting
Medical FraudUnder the Civil False Claims Act, 76 IND. L.J. 525, 529 n.13 (2001) (likening qui
tam relators to "private prosecutors" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. See id. at 583.
129. See Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Program Thanks to
the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAx REv. 447, 459 (2010) ("The False Claims Act
promotes a 'working partnership' between the qui tam plaintiff and the government by effectively
deputizing private citizens to prosecute fraud against the federal government as full participating
parties in the litigation, whether or not the government intervenes.").
130. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
131. See Pfizer Settlement Agreement at 1, 8 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/ma/news/Pfizer/Pfizer/o20Settlement%/20Agreement.pdf.
132. AstraZeneca to Pay $520 Million, supra note 118.
133. Allergan to Pay $600 Million, supra note 118.
134. See Eli Lilly to Pay $1.415 Billion, supra note 3; Sarah Rubenstein, Justice Department
Beats Chest Over Zyprexa Settlement, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 15, 2009, 2:30 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/01/15/justice-department-beats-chest-over-zyprexa-settlement/.
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to a single
2010 GlaxoSmithKline settlement;' 35 and (vi) $68 million
136
settlement.
Merck
2008
February
the
in
whistleblower
Clearly, providing information pertinent to an FCA investigation
could mean a windfall-per the particular statutory award scheme, as
much as thirty percent of the government's recovery 1 7 to a
whistleblower in a position to share what he or she believes to be
illegality. On the flip side, of course, a successful qui tam lawsuit could
mean financial ruin for the defendant entity. 138 Unfortunately, the everexpanding use of corporate whistleblowers, from uncovering suspected
fraud against the U.S. government to exposing federal tax evasion to,
now, reporting federal securities law violations, means that companies
are increasingly susceptible to whistleblower reporting occurring before
internal compliance systems are able to investigate the allegations and, if
necessary, remedy the wrongdoing.
As the proverb goes, there is nothing new under the sun. To be sure,
corporate whistleblowing has gone on long before qui tam provisions 1in
39
the FCA sweetened the deal for would-be government informants.
What notably changes the landscape, however, is the dramatically
expanded use of whistleblowers by the government. 140 Lured by
exponentially rising bounties, whistleblowers have every incentive to
report malfeasance to the government instead of to their company. More
alarming, though, is the possibility that a whistleblower might stand to
gain by collecting evidence for the government while the situation
worsens. 14 1 Any fulsome normative argument calling for the necessity of
whistleblowers as an aid to law enforcement must consider that a
whistleblower who provides information to the government does so in
lieu of offering the same to an internal compliance department which
might very well be in a position to quickly investigate and, if necessary,
remedy the illegality.
The nuances of erecting proper incentives for whistleblowersproper in the sense that individuals and corporations are thereby

135.
136.
137.
138.

GlaxoSmithKline to Pay $750 Million, supra note 118.
Merck to Pay $650 Million, supra note 118.
Barger et al., supra note 13, at 474.
See, e.g.,id. at475 &n.62.

139. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
140. See Neil Weinberg, The Dark Side of Whisdeblowing, FORBES, Mar. 14, 2005, at 90, 91.
141. In a spectacular example of such behavior, an executive at TAP Pharmaceutical Products
("TAP") spent more than half a year at the company gathering evidence of suspected fraud, later
compiling additional evidence over the course of eight years as an ex-employee while also filing a
qui tam action alleging similar misbehavior at a company rival, Zeneca. Id. at 90. While the relator
received a staggering $126 million for such efforts, the defendants connected to the alleged
wrongdoing at TAP were later cleared. Id.
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influenced to behave legally and ethically-are hard to finesse in a
vacuum. Whether Congress and the SEC happened upon the correct
formula will not be determined for some time to come. Nevertheless,
certain striking differences between the SEC's final whistleblower rules
and existing FCA provisions concerning qui tam plaintiffs deserve
mention, including whether information arguably in the public domain is
nevertheless deemed worthy of a whistleblower award. The Patient
142
Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "Affordable Care Act")
passed in 2010 narrowed the FCA's then-existing public disclosure
bar. 43 Following the revisions, the FCA allows for court dismissal of
actions based on whistleblower information deemed to constitute
"substantially the same allegations or transactions" as disclosed publicly
unless the whistleblower either first provides such information to the
government or, alternatively, has knowledge that is "independent of and
materially adds to" the public allegations and provides such to the
government before filing the qui tam action. 144 In comparison, the SEC
final rule allows for award recovery where the whistleblower provides
"original information," meaning, among other things, that the facts
relayed to the SEC must not have been "exclusively derived from an
allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a
news
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
145
information.'
the
of
source
a
is]
whistleblower
[the
unless
media,
A meaningful difference between the FCA and the SEC
whistleblower program as currently designed is the inability, at least for
the moment, for whistleblowers to file qui tam actions on behalf of the
government. By design, the SEC whistleblower program keeps the
agency in the driver's seat: A company cannot be sanctioned without the
SEC exercising its sole discretion to file suit. 146 However, the DoddFrank Act requires that the SEC's Inspector General study several
aspects of the SEC whistleblower program, including whether Congress
should allow SEC whistleblowers to bring suit on behalf of the
government and themselves.1 47 This report, expected to be issued in

142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
143. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2006 & Supp. TV 2011).
144. Id. The Affordable Care Act likewise lifted the previous FCA restriction against bringing
a qui tam action based on information disclosed in state and private proceedings and generally
granted the government the ability to oppose court dismissal of a qui tam case otherwise in violation
of the public disclosure bar. Compare31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006), with id.
(Supp. IV 2011).
145. Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545,
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,364 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249).
146. Seeid. at 34,310.
147. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
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January 2013, could give Congress ammunition to pass legislation
enabling SEC whistleblowers to enforce federal securities laws on behalf
of the government. Whether allowing private plaintiffs this right would
be "in the interest of protecting investors and identifying and preventing
fraud" 148 or instead would spur frivolous claims by whistleblower
plaintiffs merely fishing for the chance at big-time cash will need to be
carefully considered in light of the whistleblower tips that do end up
resulting in successful SEC enforcement actions.
With or without qui tam actions assisting the government to enforce
federal securities laws, the reality is that fraud enforcement is big
business. Viewed in a cynical light, rigorous enforcement of statutes
which reward whistleblowers translates to increased funding to
enforcement authorities themselves. 149 In this sense, we have evolved
from using fines as a means of deterring future wrongdoing to using
monetary sanctions as a way to grow government coffers and, with
respect to enforcement of federal securities laws, doing so at the expense
of shareholders. 150 Legislation introduced by Senators Patrick Leahy and
Charles Grassley in May 2011, the Fighting Fraud to Protect Taxpayers
Act of 201 l, 5 ' would serve to further solidify this trend. Make no
mistake: Law enforcement is in the business of enforcing laws, and
whatever-whomever--can assist them in doing so, especially when the
end result of a successful enforcement action means additional agency
funding, will be paid generously.
V.

ADVICE TO THE CORPORATION

Our experience at the highest levels of the DOJ and as U.S.
attorneys across the country give us unique insight to observe this
private-citizen-informant trend. In our time as prosecutors, we used
whistleblowers to combat fraud and corporate misbehavior. Now, in our
work with some of the world's largest and most well-known companies
§ 922(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848-49 (2010). The Dodd-Frank Act specifically requires that the SEC
Inspector General, among other things, study whether the SEC "is prompt in responding to
information provided by whistleblowers; . . . whether the minimum and maximum reward levels are
adequate to entice whistleblowers to come forward with information and whether the reward levels
are so high as to encourage illegitimate whistleblower claims." Id.
148. Id. § 922(d)(l)(G), 124 Stat. at 1849.
149. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
150. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 35.
151. Fighting Fraud to Protect Taxpayers Act of 2011, S.890, 112th Cong. (2011). Among
other things, the legislation would allow the DOJ (i) to retain a greater percentage of civil fraud
action recoveries, resulting in a projected increase of $15 million in funding for FCA enforcement
and (ii) to recover investigation and prosecution costs relating to FCA actions. Id.; S. REP. No. 112142, at 2 (2012).
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and executives, we harmonize compliance and business objectives to
design, implement, and-most importantly-operate profitably under
internal compliance programs that work. We emphasize the points laid
out below to focus companies on the elements of internal compliance
that minimize the risk of malfeasance while also maximizing the chance
that suspected wrongdoing is swiftly detected, investigated, and (if
applicable) eradicated before it becomes a cancer on the corporation.
A.

Prevention,Deterrence,and Detection:
The Essentials of Compliance

The best defense against a government enforcement action initiated
by whistleblower information is to operate within the bounds of the law.
Corporate management committed to complying with the law will build,
and thereafter operate under, an effective compliance program focused
on three essential elements: (i) prevention, (ii) deterrence, and (iii)
detection. By the time a corporation has valid whistleblower concerns, 152
it
has already failed at the first two elements of compliance.
Malfeasance of some kind has happened, and the corporation is at the
stage of worrying about who will detect it first. As a result, the best
advice to any practitioner is to nurture prevention and deterrence
vigorously.
However, even the most responsible corporate citizens cannot
always prevent or deter malfeasance by a rogue employee, group of
employees, or business unit. Therefore, corporations that want to avoid
the potentially crippling advent of a whistleblower who reports
externally must aggressively deploy sophisticated detection tools and
grow a culture of internal scrutiny. Furthermore, if the worst should
happen and a corporation faces criminal charges, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission Guidelines (the "Sentencing Guidelines") 153 recommend

152. This statement presumes that a whistleblower furnished a valid report of wrongdoing. It
might well be the case that a whistleblower would supply inaccurate or misleading information,
which once investigated would result in a determination that the company was not engaged in the
impropriety alleged by the whistleblower.
153. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2011).
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program
that a corporation be given credit for an effective compliance 54
accordingly.1
reduced
be
corporation
a
such
to
and that penalties
While each company's particular circumstance requires
individualized components, effective detection programs almost
universally contain the following essential elements:
(1) A Suite of Compliance Policies. These policies set forth the
standards and procedures to prevent and detect wrongdoing and
unethical or illegal conduct. The policies should communicate the
organization's commitment to a culture that promotes ethical conduct
and a commitment to compliance. 155 Most often, corporations will adopt
an overarching statement of principles, such as a code of conduct, that
sets forth the corporation's expectations for ethical conduct.' 56 The
specifics for the implementation of compliance programs are best broken
down into policies detailing specific functions. These policies should
include clear consequences for failure to engage in compliant behavior,

154. The Sentencing Guidelines will be quoted at length in the following footnotes to highlight
the requirements for a compliance program to be given credit under the Sentencing Guidelines. Text
which appears bold or italicized is reproduced as written in the Sentencing Guidelines.
Effective Compliance and Ethics Program
(a) To have an effective compliance and ethics program, for purposes of subsection (f) of
§ 8C2.5 (Culpability Score) and subsection (b)(1) of § 8D1.4 (Recommended Conditions
of Probation - Organizations), an organization shall(1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and
(2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct
and a commitment to compliance with the law.
Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably designed, implemented,
and enforced so that the program is generally effective in preventing and detecting
criminal conduct. The failure to prevent or detect the instant offense does not
necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective in preventing and
detecting criminal conduct.
Id. § 8B2. 1(a). The Sentencing Guidelines allow for a reduction of up to three points in the
calculation of a corporation's penalties as credit for an effective compliance program. See id.
§ 8C2.5(f). The Sentencing Guidelines also state that requiring a compliance and ethics
program is an appropriate condition of a corporation's probation. Id § 8D1.4(b)(1).
155. As the Sentencing Guidelines state: "Due diligence and the promotion of an organizational
culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law within the
meaning of subsection (a) minimally require the following: The organization shall establish
standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct." Id. § 8B2. l(b)(1). "For purposes
of this guideline: 'Standardsandprocedures' means standards of conduct and internalcontrols that
are reasonably capable of reducingthe likelihood of criminalconduct." Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n. 1.
156. See, e.g., APPLE INC., APPLE SUPPLIER CODE OF CONDUCT 5-6 (2012), available at
http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/Apple Supplier Code of Conduct.pdf;
VERIZON, YOUR CODE OF CONDUCT 8-11 (2012), available at https://www22.verizon.com/about/
careers/pdfs/CodeOfConduct.pdf; YAHOO!, WINNING WITH INTEGRITY: YAHOO!'S CODE OF ETHIcS
(2011), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/YHOO/660619262x0x239565/4f32dd
dO-82e5-47c2-ac7l-75403ebbb404/YahooCodeOfEthicsExt_1008.pdf.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:367

compensation structures that discourage noncompliance, and rewards
for
157
compliant conduct, such as bounties for disclosing malfeasance.
(2) Strong Board-of-Director Participation in Compliance Matters.
A culture that encourages reporting starts with the tone at the top. The
board of directors (the "Board") needs to be knowledgeable about the
compliance
program and
oversee its implementation
and
15
8
effectiveness. Often, a Board will enlist the audit committee or deploy
a compliance committee to assist with these responsibilities.15 9 Both the
audit and compliance committees, as applicable, should meet regularly
and welcome empirical and anecdotal reports of detection efforts and the
fruit they bear. Members of the committees must be qualified, curious,
and accessible to company management. Resources independent of
management must be made available to the committees to follow up on
suspected wrongdoing by management.
(3) Executive Leadership. Compliance responsibilities cannot be
delegated exclusively to counsel or compliance personnel. The chief
executive officer (the "CEO") and other members of the senior
management team must be involved in 160
integrating compliance policies
and procedures into business operations.
157. The Sentencing Guidelines state:
(6) The organization's compliance and ethics program shall be promoted and enforced
consistently throughout the organization through (A) appropriate incentives to perform in
accordance with the compliance and ethics program; and (B) appropriate disciplinary
measures for engaging in criminal conduct and for failing to take reasonable steps to
prevent or detect criminal conduct.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2. 1(b)(6). According to the Application Notes of this
provision: "Adequate discipline of individuals responsiblefor an offense is a necessary component
of enforcement; however, the form of discipline that will be appropriatewill be case specific." Id.
§ 8B2.1 cmt. n.5.
158. As the Sentencing Guidelines state: "The organization's governing authority shall be
knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall
exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the
compliance and ethics program." Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A). "'Governing authority' means... (A) the
Boardof Directors;or (B) if the organizationdoes not have a Boardof Directors, the highest-level
governing body of the organization." Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.1.
159. See, e.g., APPLE INC., supra note 156, at 6; VERIZON, supranote 156, at 2; YAHOO!, supra
note 156, at 1, 43.
160. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that "[h]igh-level personnel of the organization shall
ensure that the organization has an effective compliance and ethics program, as described in this
guideline. Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility
for the compliance and ethics program." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2. 1(b)(2)(B).
The Application Notes provide: "'High-level personnel of the organization' and 'substantial
authoritypersonnel' have the meaning given those terms in the Commentary to § 8A1.2 (Application
Instructions - Organizations)." Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n. 1. The Application Notes of Section 8A1.2 of the
Sentencing Guidelines contain the following definitions:
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(4) A Chief Compliance Officer. The chief compliance officer (the
"CCO") should report directly to the Board and/or its appropriate
committee(s), both on a regular basis and immediately upon becoming
aware of a serious compliance matter.161 The CCO should also have
(B) "High-level personnel of the organization " means individuals who have substantial
control over the organization or who have a substantial role in the making ofpolicy
within the organization. The term includes: a director; an executive officer; an
individual in charge of a major business or functional unit of the organization, such as
sales, administration, or finance; and an individual with a substantial ownership
interest. "High-level personnel of a unit of the organization " is defined in the
Commentary to § 8C2.5 (Culpability Score).
(C) "Substantial authority personnel" means individuals who within the scope of their
authority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of an
organization. The term includes high-level personnel of the organization, individuals
who exercise substantial supervisory authority (g.g., a plant manager, a sales manager),
and any other individuals who, although not a part of an organization 's management,
nevertheless exercise substantial discretion when acting within the scope of their
authority (e._g
an individual with authority in an organization to negotiate or set price
levels or an individual authorized to negotiate or approve significant contracts).
Whether an individualfalls within this category must be determined on a case-by-case
basis.
Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.I. In applying Section 8B2.1, the Sentencing Guidelines provide:
High-level personnel and substantial authority personnel of the organization shall be
knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program,
shall perform their assigned duties consistent with the exercise of due diligence, and
shall promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a
commitment to compliance with the law.
Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.3. Furthermore, the Sentencing Guidelines state that "[t]he organization shall use
reasonable efforts not to include within the substantial authority personnel of the organization any
individual whom the organization knew, or should have known through the exercise of due
diligence, has engaged in illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective
compliance and ethics program." Id.§ 8B2.1(b)(3). In applying this provision, the Sentencing
Guidelines state the following:
(A) Consistency with Other Law.-Nothing in subsection (b)(3) is intended to require
conduct inconsistent with any Federal, State, or local law, including any law governing
employment or hiring practices.
(B) Implementation.-In implementing subsection (b)(3), the organization shall hire and
promote individuals so as to ensure that all individuals within the high-level personnel
and substantial authority personnel of the organization will perform their assigned
duties in a manner consistent with the exercise of due diligence and the promotion of an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law under subsection (a). With respect to the hiring or promotion of such
individuals, an organization shall consider the relatedness of the individual's illegal
activities and other misconduct (ie..
other conduct inconsistent with an effective
compliance and ethics program) to the specific responsibilities the individual is
anticipated to be assigned and other factors such as: (i) the recency of the individual's
illegal activities and other misconduct; and (ii) whether the individual has engaged in
other such illegal activities and other such misconduct.
Id.§ 8B2.1 cmt. n.4.
161. According to the Sentencing Guidelines:
(C) Specific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with
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direct access to the CEO. Reports from the CCO should not be filtered
by the general counsel, the chief financial officer, or anyone else. The
CCO should be afforded the resources necessary to build a compliance
team and program
suitable to the size and complexity of the
162
corporation.
operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel and, as
appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the governing
authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program. To carry out such
operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate resources,
appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate
subgroup of the governing authority.
Id. § 8B2. 1(b)(2)(C). In applying this provision, the Sentencing Guidelines state:
If the specific individual(s) assignedoverall responsibilityfor the compliance and ethics
program does not have day-to-day operational responsibilityfor the program, then the
individual(s)wiih day-to-day operationalresponsibilityfor the program typically should,
no less than annually, give the governing authority or an appropriatesubgroup thereof
information on the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics
program.
Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.3.
162. The following are factors to consider in meeting requirements of Section 8B2.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines:
(A) In GeneraL- Each of the requirementsset forth in this guideline shall be met by an
organization;however, in determining what specific actions are necessary to meet those
requirements,factors that shall be consideredinclude: (i) applicableindustrypracticeor
the standardscalledfor by any applicable governmental regulation; (ii) the size of the
organization;and (iii) similar misconduct.
(B) Applicable Governmental Regulation and Industry Practice.-An organization's
failure to incorporateandfollow applicable industry practiceor the standardscalledfor
by any applicable governmental regulation weighs against a finding of an effective
compliance and ethics program.
(C) The Size of the Organization.(i) In General-Theformality and scope of actions that an organizationshall take
to meet the requirements of this guideline, including the necessaryfeatures of the
organization's standardsandprocedures,depend on the size of the organization.
(ii) Large Or-anizations.-A large organization generally shall devote more
formal operations and greater resources in meeting the requirements of this
guideline than shall a small organization. As appropriate,a large organization
should encourage small organizations (especially those that have, or seek to have,
a business relationship with the large organization) to implement effective
compliance and ethics programs.
(iii) Small Organizations.-In meeting the requirements of this guideline, small
organizationsshall demonstrate the same degree of commitment to ethical conduct
and compliance with the law as large organizations. However, a small
organization may meet the requirements of this guideline with less formality and
fewer resources than would be expected of large organizations.In appropriate
circumstances, reliance on existing resources and simple systems can demonstrate
a degree of commitment that,for a largeorganization,would only be demonstrated
through moreformally plannedand implementedsystems.
Examples of the informality and use of fewer resources with which a small
organizationmay meet the requirements of this guideline include the following: (I)
the governing authority's discharge of its responsibility for oversight of the
compliance and ethics program by directly managing the organization's
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(5) Hotline. A hotline is one of the least expensive yet most effective
ways for corporations to encourage internal whistleblowing and discover
possible wrongdoing. As early as 2005, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants found that "[a] key defense against
management override of internal controls is a process for anonymous
submission of suspected wrongdoing ....[V]arious forms of fraud are
detected 40 percent of the time by tips, which [makes] this the leading
method for detecting fraud."' 163 According to a survey published by the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, frauds detected by hotline
reporting mechanisms are shown to reduce the median loss to the
company by more than fifty percent.164 Key elements of a meaningful
hotline are as follows:
(a) Widespread Promotion. Hotlines should be widely
publicized internally and externally, since whistleblowers can
now be anyone (employees, contractors, vendors, and
suppliers) 165--even, in certain cases, individuals with a
preexisting duty to report malfeasance. 166 Company
communications should clearly state that this hotline is a
resource to be used at will to ask questions and report
suspicious conduct whenever the need arises.
(b) Anonymity. Reporters to the hotline must have the credible
option of remaining anonymous. Despite strong company
policies against retaliation, internal whistleblowers often fear
compliance and ethics efforts; (H) training employees through informal staff
meetings, and monitoring through regular "walk-arounds" or continuous
observation while managing the organization; (1) using available personnel,
rather than employing separate staff, to carry out the compliance and ethics
program; and (IV)modeling its own compliance and ethics program on existing,
well-regardedcompliance and ethics programsand best practices of other similar
organizations.
(D) Recurrence of SimilarMisconduct.-Recurrence ofsimilar misconduct createsdoubt
regarding whether the organization took reasonable steps to meet the requirements of
this guideline. For purposes of this subparagraph, "similar misconduct" has the
meaning given that term in the Commentary to § 8A1.2 (Application Instructions Organizations).
Id § 8B2.1 cmt. n.2.
163. AICPA Antifraud Programs & Controls Task Force, Anonymous Submission of Suspected
Wrongdoing (Whistleblowers)-Issues for Audit Committees to Consider, GLOBAL COMPLIANCE, 1
(2005), availableat http://www.globalcompliance.com/pdf/AICPAwhistleblower.pdf.
164. Ass'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD ExAM'Rs, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD AND ABUSE: 2010 GLOBAL FRAUD STUDY 42-43 (2010), availableat http://www.acfe.com/
uploadedFiles/ACFEWebsite/Content/documents/rttn-201 0.pdf.
165. See id.at 17.
166. See, e.g., Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.
34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,364-65 (June 13, 2011) (to be at codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
249) (outlining that an individual whose responsibilities include compliance and audit functions can
receive a whistleblower award if the individual meets certain criteria).
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67
retribution from their co-workers or supervisors. 1
Anonymity 68dramatically reduces the perceived threat of
retaliation. 1
Accessibility. The hotline should be both a phone line and a
web-based resource so that it is available 24/7 for inquiries.
The hotline should be capable of receiving reports in various
relevant languages.
Independence. Employees, especially those who are
reporting on their superiors or who fear retaliation, need
evidence that they are reporting to a hotline that will give their
allegations a fair and unbiased review. Independence can be
established either by engaging a third-party vendor to provide
hotline services or by building a credible internal
investigations unit.
Dialogue. Two-way communication is perhaps the most
important element of a hotline that allows for anonymous
reports. If the allegations prove to be reliable, the investigator
will likely need additional information from the reporter.
Hotline administrators should ask for the identity of the
reporter. Hotlines should be staffed with well-trained intake
personnel capable of asking appropriate follow-up questions.
Lastly, hotline staff should inform the anonymous reporter of
the means by which the reporter can communicate additional
information at a later date while still preserving anonymity.

(6) Systems to Detect Wrongdoing. 169 These systems include
independent internal audit functions, investigations, and automated
monitoring systems.
(a)

(b)

An Independent Internal Audit Function. Appropriately
conducted, resourced, and reported internal audits can bring
problems to the attention of the Board or management before
they are found by external audits or governmental authorities.
Internal Investigations. To protect the interests of the
company from both internal risks, such as embezzlement and
self-dealing, and external risks, such as previously unknown
whistleblowers, companies should build sophisticated internal

167. See Ass'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, supra note 164, at 17.
168. The Sentencing Guidelines state that "[t]he organization shall take reasonable steps ... to
have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or
confidentiality, whereby the organization's employees and agents may report or seek guidance
regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (b)(5)(C) (2011).
169. The Sentencing Guidelines state that "[tihe organization shall take reasonable steps to
ensure that the organization's compliance and ethics program is followed, including monitoring and
auditing to detect criminal conduct." Id. § 8B2. 1(b)(5)(A).
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investigations units. Quality investigations units will include:
i.
an experienced investigations team with expertise in
the company's core business, law enforcement, and
regulatory investigations;
sufficient resources to deal with the company's
ii.
volume of investigations;
an intake process capable of quickly responding to
iii.
reports of malfeasance;
iv.
a triage procedure that focuses on the worst alleged
should
procedure
triage
activity first-the
immediately escalate allegations against senior
management to the audit or compliance committee of
the Board;
v.
a committee made up of compliance and business
70
representatives to decide on corrective action;1
170. The Sentencing Guidelines state that "[a]fter criminal conduct has been detected, the
organization shall take reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to
prevent further similar criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications to the
organization's compliance and ethics program." Id. § 812.1(b)(7). The Sentencing Guidelines
clarify that "[i]n implementing subsection (b), the organization shall periodically assess the risk of
criminal conduct and shall take appropriate steps to design, implement, or modify each requirement
set forth in subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal conduct identified through this process." Id.
§ 8B2.1(c). In applying Section 8B2.1(b)(7), the Sentencing Guidelines state that the provision has
"two aspects":
First, the organization should respond appropriately to the criminal conduct. The
organization should take reasonable steps, as warranted under the circumstances, to
remedy the harm resultingfrom the criminal conduct. These steps may include, where
appropriate, providing restitution to identifiable victims, as well as other forms of
remediation. Other reasonable steps to respond appropriatelyto the criminal conduct
may include self-reporting andcooperation with authorities.
Second, the organization should act appropriatelyto prevent further similar criminal
conduct, including assessing the compliance and ethics program and making
modifications necessary to ensure the program is effective. The steps taken should be
consistent with subsections (b)(5) and (c) and may include the use of an outside
professional advisor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of any
modifications.
Id. § 882.1 cmt. n.6. To meet the requirements of Section 8B2.1 (c), the Sentencing Guidelines state
that an organization shall:
(A) Assess periodicallythe risk that criminalconduct will occur, including assessingthe
following:
(i) The nature and seriousness of such criminal conduct.
(ii) The likelihoodthat certain criminalconduct may occur because of the nature of
the organization's business. If because of the natureof an organization'sbusiness,
there is a substantial risk that certain types of criminal conduct may occur, the
organization shall take reasonablesteps to prevent and detect that type of criminal
conduct. For example, an organization that, due to the nature of its business,
employs sales personnel who have flexibility to set prices shall establish standards
and procedures designed to prevent and detectprice-fixing. An organization that,
due to the nature of its business, employs sales personnel who have flexibility to
represent the material characteristics of a product shall establish standards and
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vi.

(c)

a system for reporting on investigations and
outcomes to the Board; and
vii.
appropriate utilization, or significant inclusion, of
outside/independent counsel or auditors to conduct
the investigation.
Technologically
Advanced,
Risk-Based
Monitoring
System. According to the 2010 global fraud study published
by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, fraud
schemes proceed undetected for a median of eighteen
months.
While fraud or other malfeasance goes undetected,
the company's exposure to corrupt practices, falsified books
and records, and disgorgement risk grows as infractions and
tainted sales continue undetected.
Companies should police the activities most likely to spawn
malfeasance through the deployment of risk-based monitoring
tools, utilizing the most technologically advanced methods
available. Such automated monitoring assesses electronic
information to detect events and transactions that exhibit
potential breaches of internal controls, company policy,
regulations, or laws. The best monitoring programs are
frequent and target areas most susceptible to abuse. They are
automated, capable of generating notifications of exemptions,
and able to track any remedial activity. Automated monitoring

procedures designedto preventand detectfraud.
(iii) The prior history of the organization. The prior history of an organizationmay
indicate types of criminalconduct that it shall take actions to prevent and detect.
(B) Prioritizeperiodically,as appropriate,the actions taken pursuant to any requirement
set forth in subsection (b), in order to focus on preventing and detecting the criminal
conduct identified under subparagraph(A) of this note as most serious, and most likely,
to occur.
(C) Modif, as appropriate,the actions taken pursuant to any requirement set forth in
subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal conduct identified under subparagraph(A)
of this note as most serious, and most likely, to occur.
Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.7. Additionally, the Sentencing Guidelines explain:
Backgaround. This section sets forth the requirementsfor an effective compliance and
ethics program. This section responds to section 805(a)(2)(5) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Public Law 107-204, which directed the Commission to review and amend, as
appropriate,the guidelines and relatedpolicy statements to ensure that the guidelines
that apply to organizations in this chapter "are sufficient to deter and punish
organizationalcriminalmisconduct. "
The requirements set forth in this guideline are intended to achieve reasonable
prevention and detection of criminal conduct for which the organization would be
vicariously liable. The priordiligence of an organizationin seeking to prevent and detect
criminal conduct has a direct bearingon the appropriatepenalties and probation terms
for the organization if it is convicted andsentencedfor a criminaloffense.
Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. background.
171. ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM'RS, supra note 164, at 14.
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systems can be based on key phrases, empirical data, or the
nature of key transactions.
(7) Training. Even the best policies and procedures are ineffective if
only the compliance department is aware of them. Effective compliance
training is: (i) current, (ii) interactive, (iii) a mix of live, recorded, and
online formats, (iv) position-specific, (v) inclusive of testing elements,
and (vi) periodically measured for effectiveness. Compliance training
needs to be provided at every level of the corporation, from the Board to
field operations.' 72
Policy.
Highly
sensitive
(8) Well-Thought-Out
Privilege
investigations should be conducted and supervised either by in-house or
external attorneys who take appropriate steps to ensure that the findings
are covered by the attorney-client and work-product privileges.
(9) Periodic, Independent Assessment of Compliance Program. In
addition to ongoing efforts to assess the effectiveness of specific
elements of the compliance program, corporations benefit from periodic,
73
independent assessments of the comprehensive compliance program.
(10) Consideration of Self-Reporting. Corporate management's
decision concerning whether to self-report discovered wrongdoing is an
extraordinarily complex matter well beyond the scope of this Article.
However, practitioners should be aware of the requirements contained in

172. The Sentencing Guidelines state:
(4)(A) The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically and in a
practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the compliance and
ethics program, to the individuals referred to in subparagraph (B) by conducting effective
training programs and otherwise disseminating information appropriate to such
individuals' respective roles and responsibilities.
(3) The individuals referred to in subparagraph (A) are the members of the governing
authority, high-level personnel, substantial authority personnel, the organization's
employees, and, as appropriate, the organization's agents.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A)-03).

173. The Sentencing Guidelines state that "[t]he organization shall take reasonable steps ... to
evaluate periodically the effectiveness of the organization's compliance and ethics program." Id.
§ 8B2.l(b)(5)(B).
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the Sentencing Guidelines 174 to earn credit for self-reporting and
acceptance of responsibility.
B. Changing the Culture May Be the Most Difficult Change
Internal whistleblowing should be greatly favored by corporations
over external whistleblowing for the simple reasons that (i) wrongdoing
will be detected earlier and be less costly for the company to remedy and
(ii) the company will be more likely to avoid government intervention.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act explicitly requires public companies to create a
procedure to intake and deal with reports from employee
whistleblowers.1 75 The statute provides civil damages 176 and criminal
penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers alleging securities
fraud. 177 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the audit committee must be
provided with the necessary resources to retain outside/independent
investigators and advisors it feels are necessary to conduct appropriate
investigations. 178 Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits the

174. The Sentencing Guidelines provide:
[T]he organization should respond appropriately to the criminal conduct. The
organization should take reasonable steps, as warranted under the circumstances, to
remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct. These steps may include, where
appropriate, providing restitution to identifiable victims, as well as other forms of
remediation. Other reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct may
include self-reporting and cooperation with authorities.
Id.§ 8B2.1 cmt. n.6. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that one of the ways that a corporation can
earn credit for its compliance and ethics program is to, among other things, promptly report the
malfeasance: "the organization promptly reported the offense to appropriate governmental
authorities."Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(C)(iii). The calculation of a company's "culpability score" takes into
account self-reporting:
(g) Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Acceptance of Responsibility
If more than one applies, use the greatest:
(1) If the organization (A) prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government
investigation; and (3)within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the
offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully
cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and
affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, subtract 5 points;
or
(2) If the organization fully cooperated in the investigation and clearly
demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its
criminal conduct, subtract 2 points; or
(3) If the organization clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance
of responsibility for its criminal conduct, subtract 1 point.
Id.§ 8C2.5(g).
175. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 301, § 10A(m)(4), 116 Stat. 745,
776 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (2006)).
176. 18U.S.C.§ 1514A(2006&Supp. IV 2011).
177. Id. § 1513(e).
178. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)-(5).
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use of a company's
regular auditors to perform non-audit functions such
179
as investigations.
Companies that want to avoid whistleblowers directing tips to the
government must fundamentally reform how internal whistleblowers
have been treated. Too often, whistleblowers have been viewed as
problem employees at best. Whistleblowers have often faced alienation,
isolation, and hostility. 180 Whistleblowers, even internal, have been
treated as snitches who are disloyal to the employer for personal gain.' 8
Thus, the cultural shift that must occur is substantial.
Corporations must move from treating whistleblowers as pariah to
valuing them as information-gatherers who warn corporate leadership of
possible wrongdoing. Corporate cultures that embrace internal
whistleblowers will gain the advantages of detecting wrongdoing in its
earliest stages and reducing the likelihood of external whistleblowing.
Ending the threat of retaliation is the first step toward changing the
culture. Retaliation can take the obvious forms of firing, failing to
promote, and reducing compensation. Internal whistleblowers also have
faced more subtle forms of retaliation such as isolation, being shunned
by co-workers, intense supervision, or general alienation. 182 Successful
cultural changes work to end all forms of retaliation.
C. Steps for Creatinga Whistleblowing Culture
(1) Establish a Clearly Articulated Whistleblower Policy. Changing
the culture begins with, but certainly does not end with, changing
policies. Companies that are effective in encouraging whistleblowers to
come forward internally will create a culture where raising issues is
welcomed. Internal whistleblowers need to be encouraged and rewarded.
Elements of a robust whistleblower policy include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

a non-retaliation policy with teeth;
a clear path for reporting wrongdoing that includes both the
ability to report to immediate managers and to avoid the chain
of command entirely and anonymously;
communication of steps taken as a result of whistleblower
information; and
meaningful rewards to those who report wrongdoing.

179. Id. § 78j-1(g).
180. See, e.g., Lilanthi Ravishankar, EncouragingInternal Whistleblowing in Organizations,
SANTA CLARA UNIV., http://scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/whistleblowing.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2012).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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(2) Communicate Endorsement of Top Management. From the CEO
down to line managers, communications must demonstrate a strong
commitment to encouraging whistleblowing. These communications
need to be regular and delivered at every level-in memoranda,
newsletters, and speeches reiterating management's commitment to
ethical behavior. Public acknowledgment and monetary rewards for
employees who discover and disclose wrongdoing send a message that
resonates loudly. Training on and periodic reminders of this commitment
are especially critical to its implementation.
(3) Follow Up. The surest way to chill enthusiasm for bringing
problems to management's attention is for management to do nothing
with the information. If employees believe that they have a serious
responsibility to assist in discovering and reporting wrongdoing, they
will take the risk of making disclosures if they believe that management
has an equally strong commitment to taking all necessary corrective
action.
(4) Assess the Effectiveness of the Whistleblowing System.
Companies should regularly examine employees' understanding of how
the whistleblowing system functions as well as employee attitudes
regarding the system. Empirical data should also be examined. For
example, how does the number of calls to the hotline or the number of
investigations compare to such data in similarly sized corporations?
(5) Monitor Potential Retaliatory Actions. Like any other
malfeasance, retaliation will be avoided only if deterred and detected
when it happens. Monitoring for potential retaliation requires that
compliance departments have direct access to human resources ("HR")
systems recording employee information. Monitoring systems will track
the reporting employee's HR records post-disclosure for (i) changes in
performance appraisals, (ii) terminations, (iii) work, performance, or
training improvement plans specific to the reporting employee, (iv) job
or task reassignment, and (v) more frequent absences from work. In
addition to these objective criteria, compliance personnel should observe
the reporter closely enough to discover changes in behavior, social
patterns, and attitude, which may signal that more subtle retaliation is
taking place. Finally, follow-up interviews of the reporter should be
conducted to confirm that no retaliation is taking place.
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V1.

CONCLUSION

Congressional approval of the use of corporate whistleblowers, as
most recently evidenced by the Dodd-Frank Act's whistleblower
provisions encouraging and protecting private citizens who come
forward with information concerning possible federal securities law
violations, 183 has raised the stakes for companies across America to
implement compliance systems and controls which are effective in
preventing, detecting, and deterring wrongdoing. The highly-publicized,
financially successful federal enforcement of the FCA 184 has lead us to a
private citizen informant-for-hire model which necessarily prompts
companies carefully to examine existing compliance structures so as to
(i) properly motivate individuals with knowledge or suspicion of
corporate malfeasance to direct their information as soon as possible to
internal sources and (ii) ensure that companies have adequate resources
to execute speedy investigations and, if need be, to remedy any
substantiated wrongdoing.

183.
184.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.
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